Bd. 6 Nr. 1 (2010)

Artikel

• On the Possibility of Contigently Dispositional Properties

  Vassilios Livanios

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• There is no Such Thing as Reference Failure

  Xiaoqiang Han

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• Um Exame de Objeções a Ryle sobre o Funcionamento dos Termos Psicológicos Intencionais

  Filipe Lazzeri, Jorge M. Oliveira-Castro

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• Contra a Necessidade Metafísica da lei "O Sal se Dissolve em Água"

  Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid

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• Editorial: Seminário Newton da Costa

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• Logic is not Logic

  Jean-Ives Béziau

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• Logical Properties of Imagination

  Alexandre Costa-Leite

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• Carnap's Problem: What is it Like to be a Normal Interpretation of Classical Logic?

  Arnold Koslow

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• An Inductive Modal Approach for the Logic of Epistemic Inconsistency

  Ricardo Silvestre

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