The Rise and Fall of Disjunctivism

Abstract

In the direct realist tradition of Reid and Austin, disjunctivism has joined its precursors in proudly trumpeting its allegiance with naïve realism.  And the theory gains plausibility, particularly as compared with adverbialism, if one considers a Wittgensteinian line of argument regarding the use of sensation words.  But ‘no common factor’ doctrines can be shown to be inconsistent with the naïve realism that has served as their main support.  This does not mean that either disjunctivism or the Wittgensteinian perspective on language acquisition that informed it must be false.  It does indicate, however, that linguistic arguments against private or internal meanings do not imply perceptual directness and that the espousal of direct realism—naïve or not—does not require adherence to disjunctivism.