O caráter definicional sui generis dos predicados tarskianos de verdade

Abstract

The denitional feature of Tarski's theory of truth will be the subject of this paper. In fact, addition, multiplication and divisibility were well-known mathematical concepts before the accurate Peano (Dedekind) formalization. Analogously, the Tarski's metatheory could be an accurate formalization of ‘x is a formula’, ‘x is the reference/sense of y’ and ‘x is a true sentence’, all them introduced by definition. However, ‘x is a true sentence’, because of the paradoxes, cannot be an accurate formalization of truth predicate of ordinary language. The question is: which concept of truth does the tarskian ‘x is a true sentence’ formalize? The answer is simple and not new, but its meanders are informative and enlightening.