

# The Two-Component Theory of Proper Names and Kripke's Puzzle

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## Abstract

This paper provides a defense of the description theory of proper names by constructing a 'two-component' theory of names. Using Kripke's puzzle about belief as the stepping stone, this paper first points out problems with Kripke's direct reference theory of names. It then presents the two-component theory of names and defends it against Kripke's general criticisms of the description theory. It also compares the two-component theory of names against other leading description theories and shows how the two-component theory provides a better analysis of names. The paper offers a comprehensive summary of the debate between the description theory and the direct reference theory of names. At the end, it shows how the two-component theory of names can deal with Kripke's puzzle and more.

## Introduction

Kripke's puzzle is an old and familiar story. It was put forward in Kripke's "A Puzzle about Belief" (1979). But even today it still has such a charm that people are drawn to it time and time again. In this paper I shall use his puzzle as the stepping stone for developing a refined description theory of proper names.

The debate between the direct reference theory and the description theory is first and foremost related to the issue of *reference*. As Searle puts it, "both theories are attempts to answer the question, 'How in the utterance of a name does the speaker succeed in referring to an object?'" (Searle 1983, 234) According to the direct reference theory, names refer directly; that is to say, nothing that mediates between the name and its referent is semantically significant. On the other hand, according to the description theory, names refer in virtue of the descriptions associated with the use of the name. So the main issue being debated on is this: Is the reference of proper names *mediated* by any description? Secondly, the debate can also be construed as a debate concerning the *meaning* of proper names. The direct reference theorists argue that the *semantic value* of a proper name is simply its referent. The description theorists, on the other hand, argue that the semantic value of a proper name is the set of descriptions associated with the name. This characterization of the core issue demonstrates further that the issue of meaning (or the semantic value) of names is closely related to the issue of reference. Thirdly, Searle (1983) presents the debate as a debate between internalists and externalists. He says, "The issue is simply this: Do proper names refer by setting internal conditions of satisfaction ... or do proper names refer in virtue of some external causal relations?" (Searle 1983, 233) Description theories emphasize the speaker's intentional content associated with the name, while direct reference theories appeal to the actual causal chain between the name and its usage outside the speaker's mind. Lastly, Kripke seems to think that this is a debate between subjectivism and objectivism when he says, "It is not how the speaker thinks he got the reference, but the actual

chain of communication, which is relevant.” (Kripke 1972/1980, 93) All these interpretations of the key issue demonstrate the fact that the issue of reference, albeit a pragmatic issue, is not separable from the issue of semantics, the issue of the objective semantic value of proper names. The last two interpretations (Searle’s and Kripke’s) further point to the fact that the debate ultimately revolves around the issue whether the speaker’s psychological states (what she believes or how much she knows of the referent) play any role in determining the referent of the name (in her usage).

Kripke tries to defend his direct reference theory against the charge that it cannot explain the role of proper names in an epistemic context (such as belief, thought, etc.). There are many famous puzzles involving substitution *salva veritate* for different names of the same referent, and the description theory can easily dissolve them by suggesting that different names have different *senses*. These puzzles were considered to be defeating the direct reference theory of proper names. Kripke thus tries to demonstrate a similar puzzle that does not involve different names, and thus does not involve different *senses*. Using his *principle of disquotation* and *principle of translation*,<sup>1</sup> Kripke presents a puzzle which features a Frenchman Pierre, who is attributed the following set of beliefs:

- (1) Pierre believes that London is pretty.
- (2) Pierre believes that London is not pretty.

According to Kripke, the two belief reports attribute a contradiction to Pierre, even though Pierre himself cannot be interpreted as being inconsistent.<sup>2</sup>

Kripke also discusses another puzzle, which invokes only the principle of disquotation and no translation is involved. This is the example of Peter’s two beliefs concerning the politician/musician Paderewski. In this case, we get a similar set of contradictory belief reports:

- (3) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent.
- (4) Peter believes that Paderewski has no musical talent.<sup>3</sup>

Kripke thinks that these puzzles generate the same difficulty for both the direct reference theory and the description theory. The conclusion he draws from these puzzles is that they reveal a general feature of belief contexts that such contexts resist substitution, and the failure of substitution has no bearing on whether one adopts a direct reference theory or a description theory.

There are numerous approaches in dealing with Kripke’s puzzle:<sup>4</sup>

1. Stopping the generation of the puzzle: One could reject one or both of Kripke’s principle of disquotation and principle of translation, so as to terminate the generation of these puzzling cases.<sup>5</sup>
2. Biting the bullet: One could simply accept the verdict that Pierre and Peter have inconsistent beliefs and argue that *we all do*, thereby showing that the puzzle is *no* puzzle at all.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The two principles can be stated as follows:[PD] If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘P’, then he believes that P.[PT] If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then any translation of it into any other language also expresses a truth (in that language).

<sup>2</sup>Kripke says that we must say that Pierre has contradictory beliefs, that he believes that London is pretty *and* he believes that London is not pretty, even though Pierre himself “cannot be convicted of inconsistency.” (Kripke 1979, 122)

<sup>3</sup>For details of these puzzles, see Kripke (1979).

<sup>4</sup>For discussions on these puzzles, see Marcus (1981); Pettit (1984); Kvart (1987); Over (1983); Corlett (1989); Salmon (1986); McMichael (1987); and Loar (1987).

<sup>5</sup>For example, see Marcus (1981).

<sup>6</sup>For example, see Martinich (1997).

3. Dissolving the puzzle: One could give proper names a different analysis so that the puzzle gets *dissolved* under this new analysis.

My approach is of the third kind. Following Marcus and Katz, I argue that Kripke's puzzle applies only to a direct reference theory such as his own.<sup>7</sup> There are, of course, other versions of the direct reference theory that may avoid generating this kind of puzzle. The new direct reference theorists (such as Nathan Salmon, Mark Richard and Gareth Evans) incorporate some elements of the description theory into their direct reference theories. What I am developing in this paper, on the other hand, is a *new* description theory of proper names that incorporates some elements of the direct reference theory into the description theory. I shall also explain why we should have a description theory rather than a direct reference theory, even though the two sides are meeting in the middle ground. Since the decline of the description theory of proper names follows from Kripke's attack, my paper will treat Kripke's numerous criticisms of the description theory as the main challenge for my new description theory.

In what follows I will first briefly explain why Kripke's theory of proper names does not give us the whole story. I will then introduce my theory which I call the *two-component description theory of proper names*. My proposal will be based on the rejection of the commonly assumed sharp separation between semantics and pragmatics. Using some of the familiar cases Kripke sets up against the traditional description theories, I will explain how my theory gives a different story. Finally, I will go back to Kripke's puzzle and show how my theory can avoid attributing a contradictory set of beliefs either to Pierre or to Peter, and thereby dissolve the puzzle that Kripke poses for the description theory.

## 1 The Insufficiency in Kripke's Theory of Proper Names

For Kripke, proper names are "rigid designators" in the sense that they designate the same individuals across possible worlds. However, what a theory of names should explain, first and foremost, is not how reference gets fixed *across possible worlds*, but how reference gets fixed *in our actual world*. I think Kripke gives us too simplified a story in the latter respect. For example, Kripke talks about 'Nixon' as being fixed in our world. Kripke seems to assume that we all know which Nixon it is, to whom we then assign all the possible situations. However, it is not the case that if one simply mentions the name 'Nixon,' the name itself will do the job of getting the correct person being discussed. Suppose someone names his dog after the former president Nixon.<sup>8</sup> One day the dog owner is on his way home, and his neighbor, who takes interest in politics, informs him: "Nixon is dead." In this case the dog owner would most likely take it to mean that his dog Nixon had died. Some explanation is required in this context to reveal the fact that it was the *former president Nixon*, not *the dog Nixon*, who died that day. The reason why proper names alone are insufficient is that there might be, and in fact usually is, more than one individual who is called by that name. If a proper name *used in our world* can have more than one bearer, *which* is the one we single out in our discourse? Kripke assumes that context will usually do the job of disambiguating names with multiple bearers.<sup>9</sup> However, there are many contexts in which the usage of a name gets different associations from one speaker to another, or there may be multiple causal chains linking the tokening of a name in a single

<sup>7</sup>Marcus argues that the puzzle is "a predicament that is generated by the theory of direct reference of names taken in conjunction with a plausible disquotation principle relating belief to assent." (Marcus 1981, 501) Katz also argues that Kripke's puzzle "isn't a puzzle for description theorists, since they reject Mill's view of proper names." (Katz 1990, 32)

<sup>8</sup>This example is a spin-off from Kripke's own example of 'Aristotle.' See (Kripke 1980, 8).

<sup>9</sup>Kripke says, "In practice it is usual to suppose that what is meant in a particular use of a sentence is understood from the context." (Kripke 1980, 9)

context to various referents. Our job here is to decipher what “context” consists of and how to analyze cases of single names with multiple bearers.

Kripke appeals to a causal chain picture as a support for his direct reference theory. He says, “Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain.” (Kripke 1972/1980, 91) According to such a picture, names are supposed to designate *the one* originally dubbed by that name, and as the name passed on to us through a chain of communication, we *intend to* use the name to refer to the same person referred to by the previous user of the name. Thus, “a speaker who is on the far end of this chain” is able to, simply by virtue of using the name, refer to the individual initially dubbed that name. The problem with such a picture is that there are often *multiple* causal chains from one name leading back to different objects named.<sup>10</sup> In most cases of proper names, there may be parallel causal chains linking different referents to the same name (type). From one name mentioned, it might not be so clear which one of the objects named was at the beginning of this causal chain of communication. In Kripke’s causal theory, communication depends on the audience’s intention to use the same reference as the speaker does.<sup>11</sup> But such an intention does not guarantee success.

Suppose someone visits a Swiss museum and the tour guide introduced a painting as one done by Giacometti. Since the visitor only knows of one Giacometti, the one who made those slender-shaped figures (i. e. Alberto Giacometti), the visitor thought that this painting was done by *him*. However, the painting was actually done by Gustav Giacometti, the sculptor’s father. When the tour guide announced:

(5) This was painted by Giacometti,

her utterance was associated with Gustav Giacometti. On the other hand, if the visitor tries to report this information to a friend by uttering (5), the utterance would be associated with Alberto Giacometti. Communication via causal chain goes astray in this case.

This is a case of homonymous names, which is a common linguistic phenomenon in many languages. In his amended *Preface* to the 1980 edition of *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke added a brief discussion on the problem of homonyms. He suggests<sup>12</sup> that we treat homonymous names as *distinct* names, just as we typically treat homonymous words as distinct words (Kripke 1980, 8). I agree that it is natural to treat homonyms, such as ‘bank’ (as riverside) and ‘bank’ (as financial institution), as different words because they have different meanings. However, to argue that homonymous names should be treated as different *names* simply because they “name distinct objects” (or are connected with different causal chains) is to beg the question. What we are trying to settle here is exactly whether the referent (the object) constitutes the *meaning* of the name. This principle of individuation of names, as Kripke himself acknowledges, also “does not agree with the most common usage” (*Ibid.*) In English, as in other languages, people would say “we have *the same name*,” when it is the same word used in their names. We could of course employ the type/token distinction, and say that these people have the same type of name but different tokening. Nevertheless, this distinction still reveals the fact that the various tokenings of the name have *something in common*. It would be contrary to our linguistic practices to

<sup>10</sup>Katz (1994, 18) makes the same criticism of Kripke’s theory.

<sup>11</sup>Kripke says, “When the name is passed from link to link, the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it.” (Cited in Erwin, Kleiman & Zemach 1976, 52)

<sup>12</sup>To be sure, Kripke actually does not wish to commit to this particular principle of individuation of names, or such a view that seems to assimilate proper names to demonstratives. He said, “I should stress that I am not demanding or even advocating this usage, but mention it as a possibility to which I am sympathetic.” (See Kripke 1980, 8-10, fn. 9-12)

say that names are distinct simply because their referents are distinct, or as Kripke claims, "distinctness of the referents will be a *sufficient* condition for distinctness of the names." (*Ibid.* original emphasis)

The basic assumption behind direct reference theorists is that reference is an objective fact of the use of names in our linguistic community. Kripke posits a causal chain between the mention of a name and the object initially baptized (either explicitly or implicitly) with such a name. Keith Donnellan appeals to a historical connection, viewed by "an omniscient observer of history," between the use of a name and the referent of the name.<sup>13</sup> What the above example shows, is that the occurrence of a proper name in daily discourse does not automatically reveal the chain(s) behind the usage of that name. The first speaker, using the name Giacometti, referred to the painter, while the second speaker, even with the intention to follow the first speaker's usage, actually referred to the sculptor because his other background knowledge superseded the other intention. When there is more than one possible referent of the name, change of speaker associations may take place from one speaker to the next. The objective causal/historical chain itself is insufficient to secure successful transmission of reference. In order for the audience to *fix* the right one that bears the name, some other mechanism is required. According to Edward Erwin, Lowell Kleiman & Eddy Zemach, "Donnellan himself suggests that the speaker's intentions are also relevant." However, they continue, if the historical/causal theory of reference is to be supplemented with the speaker's intention, then the theory will be rendered either "untrue" or "unilluminating" because this simply shows that direct reference, whether it is the historical connection or the causal chain, is insufficient in securing reference (Erwin, Kleiman & Zemach 1976, 54).<sup>14</sup> What we need, I argue, is a description of the speaker's mental associations of the name. In other words, we need an *internalist* theory of names. This is where the call for a description theory comes in.

## 2 The Two-Component Description Theory of Proper Names

What I propose here is a *two-component description theory of proper names* (in short, TCD). I think two questions should be separated: "What does the name mean?" and "How does the name refer?" According to TCD, descriptions are associated with the use of proper names in two ways: One is the description that gives the meaning of the name, such as "an individual called such and such (by a certain linguistic community)." The other is the set of descriptions that the speaker *would use*, if asked, to specify the intended referent. These two descriptions compose the *sense*, or the semantic value, of a proper name. We shall treat the two kinds of descriptions as an ordered pair:

[P] <"an individual called 'F' (by a certain linguistic community),"  $\Phi$  = a set of descriptions >

The first description determines the *denotation* of the name. The set of descriptions  $\Phi$ , on the other hand, *fixes the reference* of the use of a name by that speaker. I distinguish 'denoting' and

<sup>13</sup> As Donnellan puts it, "It might be that *an omniscient observer of history* would see an individual related to an author of dialogues, that one of the central characters of these dialogues was modeled upon that individual, that these dialogues have been handed down and that the speaker has read translations of them that the speaker's now predicating snub-nosedness of something is explained by his having read those translations. This is the sort of account that I have in mind by a 'historical explanation'." (Donnellan 1977, 230, my emphasis)

<sup>14</sup> Erwin *et al* further argue that adding the speaker's intention is bringing back a descriptive account of names. They continue, "However, the historical theory of reference was developed to replace such a 'descriptivist' account, i. e. one which holds that successful reference requires that the speaker have such a capacity." (Erwin, Kleiman & Zemach 1976, 57)

‘referring’ in roughly the following way: *denoting* is a semantic relation; it is something that a name does, *referring* is a pragmatic relation; it is something that the speaker does.<sup>15</sup> Even though the distinction made here is not commonly adopted, it has been adopted by others using different terminology. Kripke distinguishes ‘semantic reference’ and ‘speaker reference’ in the case of descriptions. According to him, “If the speaker has a designator in his idiolect, certain conventions of his idiolect determine the referent in the idiolect: that I call the *semantic referent* of the designator... The speaker’s referent is the thing the speaker referred to by the designator, though it may not be the referent of the designator, in his idiolect.” (Kripke 1977, 256-57) Bach also seems to make a similar distinction when he talks about “speaker reference” and “linguistic reference.” (Bach 1984, 141) This is the kind of distinction I intend to capture, but I prefer to separate the two terms. Following Donnellan, I shall say that “referring is not the same as denoting” (Donnellan 1966, 236), and I use “denotation” in roughly the same way that Kripke uses “semantic reference.” But with regard to “reference,” or “speaker’s reference” in Kripke’s terminology, I differ from Kripke as well as Donnellan in one major respect: they both think that the speaker can refer to something outside the realm of semantic reference, while I take the speaker’s reference to be *constrained* by the semantic reference. (More on this later.)

The *denotation* of a proper name is a set, which consists of members whose qualifying property is that they are all called by that name (by a certain community).<sup>16</sup> The denotation sets the *range* of possible referents, and the speaker’s associated descriptions get us to the particular referent *within this range*. Now I shall discuss these two components separately.

### The First Component

The first component of the descriptive *sense* of a proper name is its *meaning*, which is different from the *sense*. In contrast to Kent Bach’s analysis, I argue that the meaning of a proper name is *not* analyzed as a definite singular term “*the one* called such-and-such” but as an indefinite singular term “*an individual* called such-and-such (by a certain community).”<sup>17</sup> For instance, the meaning of the name ‘Nixon’ is ‘an individual called “Nixon”,’ and the denotation of the name is the set of all members called ‘Nixon.’ Since a name is generally used to designate one member of the denoted set, not the whole set, we should further distinguish the denotation of a name itself and the denotation of the name *in use* in the following way: the denotation of the name ‘F’ in the language is a set, call it  $\lambda$ , and  $\lambda = \{\text{all individuals called ‘F’}\}$ , while the denotation *in each particular use* of ‘F’ is one member of  $\lambda$ .<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> As Strawson says, “‘Mentioning’ or ‘referring,’ is not something an expression does; it is something that someone can use an expression to do.” (Strawson 1956, 223-224)

<sup>16</sup> The condition in the parentheses is used to rule out any arbitrary stipulation by one individual. Furthermore, the condition brings in the linguistic community in which the calling relation gets established. This is a three-term relation between the name, the object named, and the linguistic community, and is thus different from the two-term relation between a name and its bearer as championed by Katz. For the contrast of the two views, see Katz (1990, 38-9).

<sup>17</sup> This is basically in agreement with Tyler Burge’s *predicate* treatment of proper names. Burge argues that even though proper names are usually used in singular and unmodified form, “they play the role of predicates, usually true of numerous objects—on all occurrences.” “[Proper names] play instead the roles of a demonstrative and a predicate. Roughly, singular unmodified proper names, functioning as singular terms, have the same semantical structure as the phrase ‘that book.’ Unlike other predicates, proper names are usually used with the help of speaker-reference and context, to pick out a particular.” (Burge 1973, 431-32)

<sup>18</sup> Katz seems to have made a similar distinction between the set and the individual. He calls the former “type reference” and the latter “token reference.” Katz says, “Let us call the referent of a word or expression its ‘type reference,’ and let us call something referred to in the use of a word or expression its ‘token reference.’” (Katz 1977, 35-36) In Katz (1990) he also states, “The type-reference of a proper noun is the collection of its bearers,” and “the criterion for a literal application of a token of the type is that the referent of the token belongs to the type-reference.” (Katz 1990, 48)

In the above analysis of the meaning of proper names, “the calling relation” and the parentheses “(by a certain community)” both need some explication. The *calling* relation is not merely established through one’s being addressed to in a certain way. “Being called as” is also one’s being mentioned as, one’s being referred to as, one is being introduced as, one’s being spoken of as, etc.<sup>19</sup> Someone’s shouting “Hey, you!” at someone else certainly does not establish “Hey, you!” as the name for that other person. Furthermore, such a calling relation is established through a communal act; it is what the linguistic community jointly has done that establishes the use of a proper name. For the purpose of communication, the use of the name cannot be restricted to only one person (even though it could be stipulated by one person initially). For instance, one may be directly addressed to by the title ‘Sir’ by some people, but one would not normally be called by and mentioned as ‘Sir’ by all members in the community.<sup>20</sup> This added condition (“by a certain community”) rules out such calling relations as a naming relation. There are, however, no strict linguistic rules, other than conventional usage, governing the use of names. ‘Seven’ could be a name; ‘Moon Unit’ could also be a name. Even a title could become a name when it is used by a community as a name. ‘Jack the Ripper’ is an example at hand.

Furthermore, my theory proposes an *indexical* treatment of the usage of proper names; that is, it treats names as *indexed* to a certain linguistic community. Kripke’s causal chain picture gives us a model explaining how an individual falls into the denoted set of a proper name, but one amendment needs to be made to that picture: The community involved does not have to be the original community to which the object named belongs. When we are dealing with proper names in English, the English speaking community is the linguistic community relevant to the case. A proper name, take ‘Socrates’ for example, should be given the following analysis:

[S] ‘Socrates’ = “an individual called ‘Socrates’ by *our* linguistic community”

This treatment does not rely on the fact that Socrates was called ‘Socrates’ in his times since it is pretty clear that he *was not*. ‘Socrates’ is a name we use for him in English. Names used in English, however, are not necessarily English names. ‘Mitterrand’ and ‘Chirac’ are good examples. Proper names have an interesting status in that they are sometimes not translated and are directly used in a different language. But there are no hard and fast rules about translation for proper names. Many names are not translated (such as different family names in Latinate languages) while many are (such as names of places or first names like ‘Peter’ and ‘Pierre,’ ‘John’ and ‘Jon,’ etc.). Instead of concluding, as some do, that names are thus not part of a language, I argue that names are *indexed* to the language and it is the language users who determine whether those names are to be translated, or to be incorporated into the language as such. The key point of this analysis is the indexical term ‘our.’ ‘*Our*’ is indexical to the user of the name, not fixed to the present writer and readers of this paper (that is, not fixed to English).<sup>21</sup> Our analysis preserves this ‘semi-independent’ status of proper names: they can either be translated or directly used in a different language. When they are translated, the translated names become the names for the individuals in the new language. And when they are directly used, those original names are the names for those individuals in the new language as well. Even if the present linguistic community is not the one that initiated the *calling* relation, as long as the

<sup>19</sup>These descriptions are all included in the definition of the word ‘call.’

<sup>20</sup>If, however, everyone in the community calls a person ‘Sir’ and mentions him as ‘Sir’ to others, then I would think that the person has adopted ‘Sir’ as his name. In a similar way, nicknames become proper names.

<sup>21</sup>In the present discussion on proper names, we are dealing only with English and the English speaking community. Thus, the parentheses (by our linguistic community) will sometimes be omitted for simplicity.

name in the initial language is preserved in the present language, we can say that the object named is called such-and-such by our present linguistic community.<sup>22</sup>

Kripke assumes that the usage of a name is passed on through a causal chain to refer back to the individual originally dubbed. But it could very well happen that *somewhere* in the causal chain an error occurred, and a historical person (or a remote object) that is called by our name was not originally so called. With a historical figure, for example, it might well have happened that somewhere in the historical chain there is a translation or even a mis-translation of the original name, such that the name which certain later communities (such as ours) come to use is no longer the same name *given* to the individual by the original community.<sup>23</sup> The same could happen to the name-passing chain of any remote object. Searle (1983) gave us an example presented initially by Gareth Evans. Searle writes, “‘Madagascar’ was originally the name of a part of Africa. Marco Polo, though he presumably satisfied Kripke’s condition of intending to use the name with the same reference as ‘the man from whom he heard it,’ nonetheless referred to an island off the coast of Africa, and this island is now what we mean by ‘Madagascar.’” (Searle 1983, 237) Furthermore, there are also cases of broken causal chains of names, such that we would have to conjure up a name to accomplish referring. For instance, we call the prehistoric woman whose remains were recently found ‘Lucy’ even though it is certain that she was not *named* so initially. When anthropologists talk about *Lucy*, they are talking about that woman. With all these cases, the calling relation allows the names to be legitimate names. As long as our linguistic community *intentionally* uses the name to refer to someone or something, the name is established for the object named.

### The Second Component

Taken by itself, a name (in each use) only signifies an indeterminate object that is a member of the denoted set. But in our daily discourse, a proper name is always associated with one particular object. I argue that proper names cannot single out particular objects without the speaker’s intention, which is specifiable by a set of descriptions. The second component of the *sense* of a proper name is this set of descriptions *in virtue of which* the speaker accomplishes reference to a particular agent. The importance of the speaker’s intention in aiding a proper name to fix the reference is especially obvious in cases of first name reference. In cases of people sharing the same first name, the mere mentioning of the name itself is not going to do the trick to secure reference. In a successful communication when one is talking about a particular person with a common first name, it requires the audience’s mental work to grasp whom the speaker *has in mind*. In general, communication is a mental game, in which all participants need to abide by the same linguistic rules. In the case of using proper names, in particular, the participants need to possess common background knowledge, shared intuitions, etc. in order to be successful in reference with proper names. There is no guarantee, however, that reference is always successful in the case of proper names.

More should be said about how this set of descriptions aids in securing reference. A proper way to understand how the associated descriptions fix the reference is to take them to express the speaker’s beliefs of the object. The speaker may believe them to be true, but some of the beliefs may turn out false. Even if some or all of the beliefs are false of the referent, they are nonetheless beliefs *about* that referent. This is the speaker’s intentionality at work. In gen-

<sup>22</sup>How the name gets passed on from other languages to the present one could be explained by homophonic translation, semi-homophonic translation, or replacement of the original name with a new name, etc. It is generally assumed, though not guaranteed, that the names in the present language have legitimate sources in other languages.

<sup>23</sup>For example, Moses might not have been called ‘Moses,’ but it is the name *we* come to use to refer to the one that did all those things the Bible attributed to *him*. More on Moses later.



eral cases of using names, the speaker has something/someone in mind, and intends to refer to this particular object by the use of the name.<sup>24</sup> The speaker does not need to have direct acquaintance with the object in order to have some beliefs about it. Naturally, these beliefs may be perceptual beliefs, and thus what the speaker would describe is based either on his/her mental images (Cindy - 'the woman with red hair') or on the conditions under which he/she established physical contact with the object (George - 'the man whom I met yesterday'). However, the descriptions could also be based merely on knowledge by description. In those cases the descriptions would describe a piece of information the speaker previously acquired of the object (Plato - 'the one who wrote *The Republic*'); or the circumstances under which the speaker acquired that information (Osama bin Laden - 'the one I read about in the newspaper'). Therefore, speaker-associated descriptions do not merely describe properties the object presumably has; they describe also the conditions under which the speaker came to know about that object. Even if the descriptions of the speaker's beliefs may be false of the object, the descriptions of the *epistemic conditions* would establish some 'parasitic links' between the speaker and the referent.

The direct reference theorists can point out that all the descriptions the speaker has might turn out false of the referent. This would be the same criticism Kripke has against traditional description theories: It may happen that Moses never went into politics; it may happen that Socrates was not snub-nosed; it may happen that Plato was not Aristotle's teacher, it may happen that Gödel did not prove the incompleteness of arithmetic, etc. If reference is accomplished by a definite description, then it can fail in these cases. According to TCD, however, reference is not merely a two-place relation between the (intended) referent and the supposed property of the referent. In other words, it is not in virtue of any property specified as a definite description of the referent (such as "the tallest spy in the world"), that secures the reference (Sam, if Sam is indeed the tallest spy in the world). On TCD, reference is a *three-place* relationship between the speaker, the referent, and the supposed properties of the referent believed by the speaker. The speaker refers to the object via the set of properties she associates with the object, the same properties that she uses to single out the referent from the denoted set. Even if the property, "being the tallest spy in the world," may be false of Sam, the property "being taken to be the tallest spy in the world by the speaker" is nonetheless true of Sam. In some cases, the speaker may have only skimpy information about the referent that she has heard about and she may be unable to provide a uniquely satisfying set of beliefs. Her reference would be parasitic on those others from whom she hears about the referent. She would still succeed in referring as long as others are successful in referring. It may happen, however, that all of the beliefs that *we* as a linguistic community have about the referent are false, and thus even *parasitically* the speaker cannot refer to the right object since no one would satisfy those descriptions. In those cases, we will have *vacuous* reference or reference to a *fictional* object, but not *meaningless* sentences, since the two sets of description still carry the semantic value of the name as well as the sentences in which the name is used.

If the set of descriptions (the  $\phi$ ) includes both descriptions of the speaker's beliefs and descriptions of the *epistemic conditions* of the speaker's coming to have those beliefs, then it is a rather large set. Only in rare cases would the  $\phi$  be an empty set. Suppose that the speaker picks up the name from a party conversation without knowing anything about the referent, he/she would at least associate the description such as "the person whom they were talking about,"

<sup>24</sup>Wettstein (1988) calls the speaker's "having something in mind" a "cognitive fix" of the speaker, and he argues that such a cognitive fix is not required for a successful referring act. However, by "cognitive fix," Wettstein means that the speaker can *correctly* distinguish the referent from everything else in the universe, while I claim that correctness is not required here.

“the person who did such and such according to them,” etc. with the use of the name. As long as the context is *informative*, one can always acquire new information concerning the referent. Even when one forgets the complete context in which one acquires the use of the name and fails to recall any information concerning the referent, one would have a minimal description such as “is a person,” “is a city,” etc. If the speaker in using a name fails even in providing those minimal descriptions, then the description he/she associates would be  $\langle$ “an individual called ‘F’,”  $\Phi = 0$  $\rangle$ . In this case I would say that the speaker is using the proper name *attributively* in Donnellan’s terminology.<sup>25</sup>

Another potential challenge for TCD is this: Even though there are many *Nixons* in our linguistic community, there is only one Nixon to whom we refer by that name when we talk about Nixon in the present English. How does this happen? Here I wish to introduce a *pragmatic* notion “the realm of discourse.” A realm of discourse is defined as the set of things discussed by (thought by) a group of people who engage in the discourse. If an individual enters a public realm of discourse, then this group of people would *usually* employ the name in the same way. For instance, even if it is quite likely that there were many people called ‘Socrates’ (‘Σωκράτης’ in Greek) around the time that our Socrates was living, he was the only one who was significant enough to enter the realm of our public discourse. Thus if you look up the word ‘Socrates’ in an encyclopedia, the descriptions you get would be of this particular Socrates. This does not mean that these descriptions are *synonymous* with the name ‘Socrates’; it only means that the reference of ‘Socrates’ is *generally fixed* in our discourse. But the fixing is not done by the name itself; it is done by the general intention of the participants of the discourse. The use of a public name is intended to refer to that particular individual, and the  $\phi$ s different people associate with the use of the name will be largely the same. There is no mystery in how different people come to share largely the same  $\phi$ : we learn about the world through interaction with others. As a result, in cases of public discourse, proper names are used *as if* they were singularly denotative. It is not because these names really *denote* a singular object, but because the participants share the intention to *refer* to the same individual. This is why we can talk about Socrates, about Nixon, or about Moses without any other specification. It is not, however, a linguistic rule that we have to talk about *this* Socrates, *this* Nixon or *this* Moses. It is rather a rule of pragmatics. A. P. Martinich (1997) defines ‘pragmatics’ in this way: “Pragmatics is the study of how language is used. . . . Pragmatics focuses on the interaction between speakers and hearers. The major idea that guides research in this area is that speaking is intentional behaviour and governed by rules.” (Martinich 1997, 12) Rules of pragmatics depend on the context and the intention of speakers and hearers. Under the present theory, it is not a *wrong* use if one uses a certain name, which normally picks up one particular member in the name-set, to pick out another member. It would be a wrong use, on the other hand, if one uses a certain name to pick out someone by a different name.

To recap, according to TCD, the *sense* (or the *semantic value*) of a proper name should include two components, one determines the name’s denotation and the other determines the speaker’s reference by using the name. I call the first component the *meaning* of the proper name; the second component, the *associated descriptions* of the proper name. Anyone who satisfies the same calling relation (namely, being-called-by-the-same-name) can qualify as a member of the same set. The *denotation* of a proper name is thus a set, which could have multiple, single, or even no members (if the name is an empty name). The *referent* of a proper

<sup>25</sup>According to Donnellan (1966), a description is used *referentially* if the speaker has the object in mind, and it is used *attributively* if the speaker simply uses a description to pick out *whoever* satisfies the description.

name, on the other hand, is the particular member of that set, the member that is being picked out by the intention of the speaker.<sup>26</sup> The speaker's intention is expressible by descriptions of her beliefs, her mental images, her epistemic relationship with the object, etc. The associated descriptions 'fix' the reference for the speaker's utterance, and thus there is no ambiguity of a proper name in an utterance (as long as the speaker knows what she has in mind). The *semantic value* of a proper name in different utterances, on the other hand, would be different from person to person. Semantic value corresponds to cognitive value. This difference in semantic, and thus cognitive, values explains why one would take 'Cicero is Tully' to be a trivial statement, while another would take it to be informative.

### 3 Reference and Truth

Under TCD, reference is not *direct*; rather, reference is *mediated* through the speaker's associated descriptions. This feature separates TCD from any form of *direct reference* theory. Let us now turn to the issue of *indirect* reference. The ordered pair [P] should determine the actual referent, the  $\alpha$ , of each utterance. The first component of [P] describes any *indeterminate* member of the denoted set  $\lambda = \{\text{all individuals called 'F'}\}$ . The second component of the ordered pair picks out *that* particular member, the  $\alpha$ , and  $\alpha$  belongs to  $\lambda$ . Thus  $\alpha$  should be a member of the denoted set that is being singled out by the speaker's associated descriptions. I contend that reference cannot be successful without using the right name. As Burge remarks, "A proper name occurring in a sentence used by a person at a time designates an object *if and only if* the person refers to that object at that time with that proper name, *and the proper name is true of that object*." (Burge 1973, 435, my italics) This is simply the linguistic rule of name-using and the social habit of following that rule.<sup>27</sup> For instance, if I intend to refer to Plato by using the name 'Aristotle,' even if I associate all the right descriptions (such as *the one who wrote the Republic*, etc.), I *do not* refer to Plato *by that name*. One may argue that just as Donnellan can use descriptions that don't match to "refer to" a particular individual (what he calls *the referential use* of descriptions), we can also use names that are *not true of the object* to refer to a particular individual. What matters, the line of argument goes, is what the speaker *intends to refer to*. Kripke seems to have taken this line of argument. He gives the example in which two people see Smith in the distance and mistake him for Jones. One person asks: "What is Jones doing?" while the second person answers: "(He is) raking the leaves." According to Kripke, even though the name 'Jones' "*never* names Smith," "in some sense, on this occasion, clearly both participants in the dialogue have referred to Smith."<sup>28</sup> (Kripke 1977, 257) My reply is that there is a sense in which we say that the first speaker succeeds in *referring*, but the speaker does not *use the name* to refer in this case. What the speaker does instead, is to refer by means of other contextual expediency (such as pointing, gazing at, etc.). The use of the name 'Jones' plays no significant role in the referring act. In other words, the only means the two speakers actually use to accomplish their referring to Smith is their contextual relationship to Smith. The name 'Jones' used in this context is simply a "misnomer."

Truth values are assigned to the utterance of a sentence, or we can say, to the proposition expressed by an utterance. According to P. F. Strawson (1956), sentences themselves have

<sup>26</sup>Even though pragmatics relies on the interaction between speakers and hearers, it is mainly the speaker's intention that fixes the reference of an utterance. The hearer may very well have a different set of associated descriptions upon hearing the name mentioned. If the hearer's descriptions would pick out the same referent as the speaker-intended referent, then communication is successful. If not, misunderstanding gets generated.

<sup>27</sup>Katz makes a similar observation. He says, "What makes a word the right name for a thing is that the thing fits or conforms to the meaning of the word in the language." (Katz 1990, 47)

<sup>28</sup>Of course this is an example of "speaker's reference."

meaning but no truth value, and yet we can make use of a sentence to “express a true or false proposition.” (Strawson 1956, 223) A sentence of the type “Nixon is dead” in itself cannot be assigned a definite truth value, since it means something such as “Someone called ‘Nixon’ is dead.” In our normal usage where we talk about Richard Nixon, the utterance is true after April of 1994. But the utterance “Nixon is dead” by our dog-owner’s neighbor would be true only if the intended referent is the former president Nixon, and would be false if the intended referent is the dog Nixon. The need to assign different truth values to different utterances of the same sentence shows that after the ordered-pair of descriptions fixes an  $\alpha$  for an utterance, it is this  $\alpha$  that we evaluate when we assign a truth value to that utterance. The semantic content of the proper name is incorporated into the semantic content of the sentence in which the name appears, through the identification (*via* descriptions) of the  $\alpha$  in question. Take “Socrates is wise” for example. Our analysis of its truth value will be rendered as such: “Socrates is wise” is true iff an individual called ‘Socrates’ (by our linguistic community) is singled out in virtue of a set of descriptions in the mind of the speaker, and this individual is wise.

It is not the case that all utterances can be successfully assigned a truth value. There are cases when the set of descriptions cannot generate any real  $\alpha$ , such as in the case of empty names. If the fictional name ‘Worf,’ for example, has never been used by any actual person, then  $\lambda = \{\text{all individuals called ‘Worf’}\}$  is an empty set. Most cases of fictional names, however, do not belong to this category. Santa Claus does not exist, but there is a town called ‘Santa Claus.’ There is no Pegasus, but there might be companies named ‘Pegasus.’ I argue that the  $\alpha$  doesn’t get fixed in these cases not because  $\lambda$  is empty, but because  $\Phi$  fails to pick out any member in  $\lambda$ . In cases where there are entities called by that name, but the speaker’s descriptions fail to pick out any member of the set, the reference is vacuous and the name is empty. Under TCD, a sentence containing an empty name is not *meaningless*. In Kent Bach’s words, “reference failure does not lead to loss of meaning.” (Bach 1984, 174) Depending on the scope reading, in some cases such a sentence would be false while in others it would have no truth value.

Previously I have distinguished *meaning* and *sense*. Now based on what I have said about the assignment of truth values, I wish to introduce a third notion: *content*. The *content* of a proper name is the referent *mediated by* the ordered pair (the two components) of descriptions:

[Q]  $\alpha < \text{“an individual called ‘F’,” } \Phi = \text{a set of descriptions} >$

where  $\alpha$  is the object referred to, ‘F’ is the name the speaker uses to refer to  $\alpha$ , and  $\Phi$  is the set of descriptions the speaker *would* use to specify  $\alpha$ .<sup>29</sup>

Using [Q], we can analyze the above example of “Nixon is dead” as (6) and (6’):

- (6) Nixon ( $< \text{“an individual called ‘Nixon’,” } \Phi = \{\text{is a man, is a former U.S. President, has a large nose and sad-looking eyes, ...}\} >$ ) is dead.
- (6’) Nixon ( $< \text{“an individual called ‘Nixon’,” } \Psi = \{\text{is a dog, has a large nose and sad-looking eyes, ...}\} >$ ) is dead.

With the Giacometti case mentioned earlier, TCD would fare much better than Kripke’s theory. Our analysis would render the tour guide’s remark as (5’):

- (5’) This was painted by Giacometti ( $< \text{“an individuals called ‘Giacometti’,” } \Phi = \{\text{a Swiss painter working in the late 19th Century, etc.}\} >$ ).

On the other hand, when the museum visitor also utters (5), his utterance should be analyzed as (5’):

<sup>29</sup>Having the object itself in the proposition does not make the theory *directly referential*, since the object is mediated through the descriptions.

- (5") This was painted by Giacometti (< "an individuals called 'Giacometti',"  $\Phi = \{a \text{ Swiss sculptor who made slender-shaped figures, etc.}\} >$ ).

I think in this case the tour guide and the visitor use the same sentence-type, which can be analyzed as meaning that the painting was done by someone called 'Giacometti.' However, their utterances do not have the same content in that the tour guide refers to Gustav Giacometti and she is right, while the visitor refers to Alberto Giacometti and he is wrong.

This shift of intention also poses a problem for Kripke's theory concerning speech reports, while TCD can handle this sort of problems easily. Suppose the visitor says

- (7) The tour guide said this was painted by Giacometti,

he reports a different *content* of her utterance even though he uses the same words she used. Under Kripke's theory, the visitor would be referring to Gustav Giacometti since he did intend to use the name that the tour guide did. Therefore what he utters would be true as well. Consider the fact that the visitor knows nothing about Gustav Giacometti and his associated descriptions actually pick out the-Giacometti-who-made-those-slender-shaped-figures, it does not seem correct to say that he is referring to Gustav Giacometti simply because he has heard the name 'Giacometti' from someone who did refer to Gustav. On the other hand, TCD can allow us to assign different propositional contents as well as different truth-values to the utterances made by different speakers. There are conceivably many other cases where intentional fixing changes from one speaker to the next. Kripke's causal theory of reference fails to explain these cases.

I now want to show how TCD deals with some of the problems Kripke presents as a refutation of the description theory. One of Kripke's attacks focuses on William Kneale's description theory of names. Kneale's theory is that the meaning of a name is simply 'the individual called by that name.' Kneale argues that statement (8) is trifling or non-informative:

- (8) Socrates *was* called 'Socrates.'

If (8) is trifling, then it must be because the name 'Socrates' itself has already included the information given by the predicate. Therefore, Kneale concludes, 'Socrates' *means* "the individual called 'Socrates'."

Kripke rebukes this argument by pointing out that (8) "isn't trifling on any view," because it could happen that the Greeks did not call Socrates 'Socrates' (Kripke 1972/1980, 69). I agree with Kripke on this point. But an important feature in (8) is the past tense verb ('was') used by Kneale. I think if (8) is stated as

- (9) Socrates *is* called 'Socrates,'

then that statement is trifling or non-informative. Under (9), Kneale's argument could support the meta-linguistic analysis of the meaning of 'Socrates.'

How do we explain the difference between the triviality of statement (9) Socrates *is* called 'Socrates' and the non-triviality of statement (8) Socrates *was* called 'Socrates'? Under TCD, the *calling* relation is indexed to the present language used, thus (8) as analyzed in the following way is not trifling:

- (8') An individual called 'Socrates' by the present English-speaking community was also called 'Socrates' by the ancient Greeks.

And (9) is analyzed in this way which clearly shows how it is a non-informative statement:

- (9') An individual called 'Socrates' by the present English-speaking community is called 'Socrates' by the present English-speaking community.

This shows that Kneale is partially correct: the meaning of the name 'Socrates' does include a piece of meta-linguistic information.

Kripke's second criticism of Kneale's description theory is that it violates what he calls "the non-circularity condition":

- (C) For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate (Kripke 1972/1980, 68).

What is barred by (C) is a circular theory of reference, which uses the notion of reference itself in defining the way to fix the reference. Kneale's theory of proper names, at least as Kripke interprets it, uses "the individual called such and such" *both* as the meaning of 'Socrates' *and* as a way of referring to Socrates. Kripke argues: "Obviously if the only descriptive senses of names we can think of are of the form 'the man called such and such,' ... then whatever this relation of *calling* is is really what determines the reference and not any description like 'the man called *Socrates*.'" (Kripke 1972/1980, 70) In this criticism, Kripke seems to take the word 'calling' used in this context to be expressing the same notion as 'referring,' and he thus charges Kneale's theory with the violation of the non-circularity condition. However, under TCD, 'being called such and such' only gives us a descriptive property of members of the name-set (the denotation); it does not determine the exact referent. TCD does not violate the non-circularity condition in that as a theory of reference, what determines the reference is the speaker's intention, which is expressed by the associated descriptions. In contrast to Kneale's theory that uses the same description to give the meaning *and* to fix the reference of a proper name, TCD separates the functions of the two components of descriptions. The associated descriptions in the speaker's mind do not *give the meaning* of proper names. What those descriptions do, is to help identify the referent fixed by the speaker's intention. What determines the meaning, on the other hand, is the denotation of the name. We need to have the two kinds of descriptions to complete both denoting and referring. Once the two components are assigned separate roles, there is no circularity in the definition of reference.

Kripke presents another case that is supposed to be a problem for a particular form of description theory—the cluster concept theory of names (Kripke 1972/1980, 58-59; 64-67). In the example (borrowed from Wittgenstein), Kripke discusses the following statement:

- (10) Moses does not exist.

Kripke argues that the Biblical descriptions should not be used to fix the reference of the name 'Moses,' because the failure of satisfaction for the Biblical descriptions of Moses does not lead to the negation of Moses' existence. For one thing, it might happen that Moses did exist but he did not do any of the things that the Bible attributed to him; in other words, the Biblical story might have been a complete fabrication about a real person. Kripke says, "[I]n that case maybe no one would have done any of the things that the Bible relates of Moses. That doesn't in itself mean that *in such a possible world* Moses wouldn't have existed." (Kripke 1972/1980, 58, my emphasis) Kripke's point is that since the properties attributed to *our Moses* in the Bible are not "necessary" properties, we could easily imagine *the same Moses* without having done any of the things that the Bible describes. Therefore, even if all these descriptions were not *true of* Moses in some possible world, we cannot conclude that Moses would not exist in that possible world (in Kripke's conception, a possible world is simply a possible scenario, not a separate realm). What Kripke takes for granted here is that model considerations are built on the actual referent in our world. That is to say, we first use either the Biblical descriptions or the causal chain of the name 'Moses' to fix the reference directly on the person Moses, and then we suppose that in a possible world, this person might not have done any of the things attributed to him in the Bible. However, I argue it that if it were true that our Moses had not

done any of the things attributed to him, then our Moses as described in the Bible *does not exist*. In other words, I argue that (10) does mean that *the Moses described in the Biblical story* does not exist. The name 'Moses' is a placeholder for all the Biblical descriptions about *someone*, and if none of the descriptions is true of *anyone*, then the one called 'Moses' in the Bible is simply a fictional character. The putative fact that there was someone named Moses in ancient times is irrelevant to our historical interest and Biblical verification. Therefore, I conclude that even if there were a Moses who had never gone into politics or religion, (10) is still true. The name 'Moses' is a *disguised* set of definite descriptions found in the Bible, and what (10) states is a simplified form of (10'):

(10') Moses ( $< \text{"an individuals called 'Moses' in our usage," } \Phi = \{\text{the leader of the Exodus, the Hebrew baby boy adopted by the Egyptian royal family, the person who received the Ten Commandments from God, etc.}\} >$ ) does not exist.

A general skepticism I have about Kripke's causal chain theory is that even in cases such as Moses, he assumes that there was some *invisible* causal chain leading from our current usage of the name back to the *actual* referent of the name. Without knowledge of acquaintance, as in most cases, what we have when we use a proper name is simply the *intended* referent. With legendary figures (and possibly some historical names), there is no guarantee that there was ever this causal chain going back to the actual referent. All we have in our current usage is our *projected* properties of these referents. If there were people called 'Moses' so the name does not denote an empty set, but somehow all the descriptions we associate with this name do not pick out anyone in the set, then there is no individual who is picked out by the name 'Moses' *in our usage*. The negative existential statement (10) should be analyzed as the denial of the fact that anyone satisfies the descriptions we associate with the name:

(10'') It is not the case that [there is an  $\alpha$  such that  $\alpha$  belongs to  $\lambda = \{\text{all individuals called 'Moses'}\}$  and  $\Phi\alpha$ ].

In other words, the negative existential should be analyzed, as Russell suggests, as the secondary occurrence of the *disguised* definite descriptions associated with the name 'Moses.'

Another problem that Kripke attributes to the description theory involves Gödel. This is a case where "the person named by that name did not satisfy the descriptions usually associated with it, and someone else did." (Kripke 1972/1980, 254) If *the only* description we have about Gödel is "the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic," and it *could* turn out that Gödel didn't really prove it, but someone else called 'Schmidt' did, then the description we give would fix Schmidt for the name 'Gödel.' With TCD, however, such a situation would not occur. The *descriptions* we give to the name 'Gödel' in this case would be an ordered pair:

(G)  $< \text{"an individual called 'Gödel'"}, \Phi = \{\text{is the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.}\} >$

If Gödel did not actually prove the incompleteness of arithmetic, *no one else* would satisfy this ordered pair of descriptions. However, such an analysis is still insufficient. (G) gives a more limited *sense* to the name 'Gödel' than what the name usually has in our discourse. The  $\Phi$  that a speaker associates with the name 'Gödel' is generally something like (G'):

(G')  $< \text{"an individual called 'Gödel'"}, \Phi = \{\text{is the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, is the person whose name I have read in many logic books, ...}\} >$

In other words, the  $\Phi$  the speaker associates with the name is generally not a single description, but a set that includes descriptions of the speaker's epistemic conditions of the name. This point has been made by John Searle in his *Intentionality*: "At the very least, he [the speaker] has 'the man called "Gödel" in my linguistic community or at least by those from whom I got

the name’.” (Searle 1983, 251) Searle calls the speaker’s cluster beliefs her “Intentional content,” and argues that the speaker can still use the name to *parasitically* refer to Gödel even if she is misinformed about who actually proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. The way we succeed in referring to Gödel by using the limited information that we have of *him* is based on the fact that we learned about him in this way. It would not be the case that anyone who happens to satisfy the sole description “the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic” would thus become the referent of the name ‘Gödel.’ It would rather be the case that the man Gödel would satisfy the set of descriptions, because part of the descriptions describe *the epistemic conditions* under which we learned about this name. Kripke’s mistake in his attack on description theories is that he assumes that such descriptions fix the referent only via an external, objectively ascertained *true-of* relation, while Searle’s cluster theory or my TCD treats descriptions to be specifications of what the speaker has in mind; i.e. the speaker’s internal psychological states of belief. As explained earlier, such beliefs would include not only the speaker’s belief *of* the attribute of this putative referent, but also the speaker’s beliefs about the epistemic conditions under which she acquired such a belief. Some of the external causal chains that Kripke champions can enter the speaker’s psychological states, and thereby help secure the right referent. But the point is, external causal chains by themselves do not suffice. If *all* beliefs the speaker has concerning the attributes of the putative referent, as well as about how or from whom she acquired the name, turn out to be false, then I must judge that the speaker simply does not know what she is talking about and her use of the name fails to refer.

Finally, I shall address the Modal Argument that Kripke puts forth against the description theory. Kripke thinks that the descriptivist approach gets the counterfactuals wrong, because “although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been *called* ‘Nixon’).” (Kripke 1972/1980, 49) By this argument, both the qualitative description (“was a President of the United States”) and the meta-linguistic description (“was called ‘Nixon’”) fail to ‘fix’ the reference across possible worlds. No doubt this is a good argument, but I don’t think the description theorist necessarily insists on fixing reference *across possible worlds* purely by the descriptions one uses to fix the reference *in our world*. Let us consider these two statements by Kripke:

(11) It is not the case that Nixon might not have been Nixon.

(12) Nixon might not have been called ‘Nixon.’

TCD gives them the following analyses:

(11’) It is not the case that [there is an  $\alpha$ ,  $\alpha$  belongs to  $\lambda = \{\text{all individuals called ‘Nixon’}\} \& \Phi\alpha$ , and possibly ( $\alpha \neq \alpha$ )].

(12’) There is an  $\alpha$ ,  $\alpha$  belongs to  $\lambda = \{\text{all individuals called ‘Nixon’}\} \& \Phi\alpha$ , and possibly [ $\alpha$  is not called ‘Nixon’].

(11’) and (12’) seem to preserve the intuitive distinction that Kripke makes with regard to two kinds of possibility. In other words, we fix the referent of ‘Nixon’ in our world in the same way TCD describes, *and then* we assign possible counterfactuals to this fixed referent. This fixed-in-the-actual-world brings in *indexicality* to the present language and the realm of discourse. A name used in our present discourse will always pick out the same individual across possible worlds, because it is *this* person whose counterfactuals we are considering. Joseph Almog in “Naming Without Necessity” suggests that naming is naming, and necessity is necessity, and that the connection Kripke tries to draw between the two is unfounded. Almog argues that we should distinguish *two stages* in our semantic theory: the *generation* stage and the *evaluation* stage. In the *generation* stage, we generate the propositional constituent (such as an individual



person) corresponding to a name. And the question for this stage is whether the name refers to the individual *via* some descriptive content. In the *evaluation* stage, we evaluate the truth of the proposition in a possible world. And the question for this stage is whether the individual (not the name) bears modal attributes. Almog writes, "The two questions are definitely different. One concerns language. The other is metaphysical, having nothing to do with names. The two questions are not only different; they are independent of each other. First, one could hold the semantical view that names refer by means of descriptive concepts, and yet couple this stand with the metaphysical view that objects ... bear modal attributes.... Conversely, ... we could have naming without necessity. One could believe that names do not refer by means of descriptive concepts, and couple this semantic view with a skeptical metaphysical attitude toward modal individualism." (Almog 1986, 229) Almog himself holds the second view. It should be clear from what has been argued in this paper that I hold the first view, which Almog calls "necessity without naming."

In summary, TCD is a more complete theory than Kripke's direct reference theory, and it does not have the same problems that older description theories do. As A. P. Martinich remarks, "Perhaps behind Kripke's puzzle is an even more general misconception about language: the belief that language is self-contained and that purely linguistic knowledge is sufficient for using language." (Martinich 1997, 31) I think what is being left out in this self-contained view on language is the speaker. In contrast to this picture of a two-term relation between language and the world, the *two-component description theory* is based on the picture of a three-term triadic relation amongst language, speaker and the world.<sup>30</sup> In such a picture, we can *speak about* the world both because we, as speakers, intend to refer to things or events in the world, *and* because the language we use *gives descriptions* of the world. The speaker apprehends the *meaning* of terms in a language prior to choosing the terms for the intended reference. On the other hand, the speaker's intention picks out *the one* called such and such, and it is the speaker's intention that determines the referent within the denoted set. Even if denotation can be established as a verifiable objective fact in most cases, reference is a psycholinguistic act accomplished by the linguistic community. In other words, denoting is *objective* in the sense that it is governed by the *fact* that someone was indeed called such-and-such, whereas referring is a subjective, or *intersubjective*, speech act that could sometimes fail to locate the right referent. Kripke's causal chain theory does not give us a sufficient theory about speaker reference; about how a speaker speaks about a particular individual called by that name. Kripke is right in emphasizing the importance of the relation of causal chain, but this relation simply does not give us the whole story.

There are people who take speaker reference to be in the domain of the *pragmatics*, not *semantics*, of names.<sup>31</sup> I argue, however, that semantics cannot be separated from pragmatics, and speaker reference should be considered as part of the semantics of names in the language. Language in itself sometimes gives only a *partial* proposition, and we have to consider the speaker's intention to complete the content of the proposition. At the same time, language sometimes gives us more than one proposition as in the case of proper names with multiple bearers, and we also need to consider the speaker's intention to pin down the particular proposition expressed. Without the speaker aspect, the semantics of language cannot be either complete or accurate.

<sup>30</sup>The philosophers who hold such a two-term relation would be Tyler Burge, Howard Wettstein, etc. The three-term relation, on the other hand, seems to be explicit or implicit in the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Gareth Evans, etc. Another kind of picture neglected here is a two-term relation between the speaker and the world, which seems to be implicit in the different theories of speaker's meaning.

<sup>31</sup>Examples are Katz (1990) and Fodor (1994, 111-112).

The two components cannot be separated if our usage of a name is to bring us to the right individual.<sup>32</sup>

Kripke says that any theory of beliefs and names must deal with the puzzles about Pierre's and Peter's beliefs, so now I will go back to Kripke's puzzle.

## 4 An Application of TCD: Back to Kripke's Puzzle and Others

Kripke thinks that the case of Pierre's belief resembles the case of Jones' belief about Cicero and Tully. So we shall begin with the latter case. Why is it that Jones may believe that Cicero is bald while denying that Tully is? With the analysis of the *two-component description theory*, we can explain that it is because "a person called 'Cicero'" and "a person called 'Tully'" are different descriptions. Even when the only description Jones associates with both names 'Cicero' and 'Tully' is merely 'is a Roman orator,' we would still have the difference in names in Jones' mind. So we can have:

- (13) Jones believes: Cicero ( $< \text{"an individual called 'Cicero'"}, \Phi = \{\text{is a Roman orator}\} >$ ) is bald, *and*  
 Jones believes: Cicero ( $< \text{"an individual called 'Tully'"}, \Phi = \{\text{is a Roman orator}\} >$ ) is not bald.

This kind of analysis does not require that all propositions involving different names express *distinct* beliefs of the subject. If, for instance, Sally knows that Cicero is Tully, then Sally's belief would be expressed as:

- (14) Sally believes: Cicero ( $< \text{"a man called 'Cicero'"}, \Phi = \{\text{a Roman orator, is also called 'Tully', ...}\} >$ ) is bald.

In this way we would not have too many beliefs individuated by the different names the subject chooses to express her belief.

With the case of Paderewski, Peter uses the same name but he associates different descriptions with the name. Our ascription should be like (15):

- (15) Peter believes: Paderewski ( $< \text{"an individual called 'Paderewski'"}, \Phi = \{\text{is a musician, ...}\} >$ ) has musical talent,  
*and*  
 Peter believes: Paderewski ( $< \text{"an individual called 'Paderewski'"}, \Phi = \{\text{is a politician, ...}\} >$ ) has no musical talent.

This gives us no problem since it is reasonable for anyone to think that there are two 'Paderewski' being referred to in the two utterances. Similarly, Peter can assent to a sentence such as "Paderewski is not Paderewski" by taking it to mean "this Paderewski is not that Paderewski" without violating the law of contradiction.

Kripke asks us to decide whether the sentence "Pierre believes that London is pretty" is true or false. But as I argued earlier, sentences themselves do not have truth value. What we

<sup>32</sup>While putting the same emphasis on the meta-linguistic analysis of the meaning of proper names, TCD is distinguished from Bach's NDT and Katz's PMT in exactly the incorporation of pragmatics into the semantics of proper names. Both NDT and PMT are taken to be *merely* a semantic theory; a theory of sense, not of reference. Bach says, "NDT... does not even purport to be a theory of reference. It is nothing more than a modest theory of the modest meaning of names." (Bach 1984, 161) Katz also says that his PMT "is (part of) a theory of sense, not a theory of reference." (Katz 1990, 40) Both Bach and Katz argue that their theories are therefore not responsible for answering Searle's criticism that the meta-linguistic sense of the name is *insufficient* in terms of fixing the reference in contexts. They also both think that their theories are thus immune to Kripke's circularity argument. I have argued, however, that the issue of reference is an essential part of a semantic theory of proper names.

should do in this case is to find the proper proposition expressed by, or the semantic value of, the utterance. With Pierre's belief, my proposed ascription is this:

- (16) Pierre believes: London (< "an individual called 'Londres' (by the French-speaking community),"  $\Phi = \{\text{is a city in England, is the city of which I have seen a postcard, ...}\} >$ ) is pretty,

and

Pierre believes: London (< "an individual called 'London' (by the English-speaking community),"  $\Phi = \{\text{is a city in England, is where I reside at the moment, ...}\} >$ ) is not pretty.

The name within the quotation marks will not be translated. Thus, even when Pierre associates the same set of descriptions with 'Londres' and 'London,' his beliefs do not express the same propositions. I thus think that Kripke's puzzle *could not* be generated under a properly laid out description theory such as TCD.

Kripke asks: "What is it about sentences containing names that makes them – a substantial class – intrinsically untranslatable, express beliefs that cannot be reported in any other language?" (Kripke 1979, 129) I think the reason is that proper names are really dependent on the communal usage of a linguistic community. Statements such as 'Londres is London,' 'Eiffel Tower is la Tour Eiffel,' 'Köln is Cologne' are by no means trivial. They convey important information in language acquisition. The way a name is given and used is very much dependent on the conventions of a linguistic community and the sub-groups within. By giving a standard translation of names, we are also changing the context and the epistemic condition of the subject.

Finally, I want to explain why I think the theory of proper names should not be any form of direct reference theory. The main difference between the direct reference theory and the description theory lies in the assertion concerning whether reference is *direct* or *mediated*. In this paper I have argued how reference has to be mediated through the two sets of descriptions, and thus the direct reference theory simply takes the wrong approach. The first component of TCD, the meta-linguistic description of the meaning of the name as "an individual called such-and-such (by a certain community)," is necessary in the mediation of reference. That is to say, the reference of a proper name has to be mediated through social, conventional usage of the name. Secondly, when we talk about an object, the object being discussed always comes into our discourse *via* one perspective (*mode of presentation*) or another. The second component of TCD captures how speaker reference is *mediated* through descriptions of the way (the mode) in which the object is presented to the speaker. Kripke's causal chain or Donnellan's historical explanation take the perspectives out of the speaker's mind and put it in the mind of an "*omniscient observer* of history." But our language is used by people *like us* and we are not omniscient. This fact explains why substitution *salva veritate*, which poses no problem for an omniscient observer, always poses a problem in an epistemic context involving ordinary speakers. This also illustrates the deficiency of direct reference theory in general.

Kripke's conclusion concerning the puzzles involved in the epistemic context seems pessimistic. He says, "When we enter into the area exemplified by Jones and Pierre, we enter into an area where our normal practices of interpretation and attribution of belief are subjected to the greatest possible strain, perhaps to the point of breakdown. So is the notion of the *content* of someone's assertion, the *proposition* it expresses." (Kripke 1979, 135) However, I think the problem of substitution *salva veritate* is a serious problem for the direct reference theory. What it pushes for, is not to abandon the hope of finding an acceptable belief ascription, but

to always consider the subject's meta-linguistic beliefs as well as her other relevant beliefs about the object. With a description theory properly laid out that captures those other beliefs, there is no puzzle about beliefs.

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