

Editorial

In the last few years, the philosophical community has witnessed an interest in highlighting the role of social factors in cognition and its development. This gave rise to new interdisciplinary research projects not only in philosophy, but also in social and psychological sciences. The introduction of theoretical notions such as “shared worldviews” or “shared intentionality” blurred the classical demarcation lines between social and psychological phenomena, and urged a more permissive interpretation of the relation between their respective ontologies. This special issue of *Abstracta* aims to contribute to this emerging field of research with contributions that approach the relation between psychological and social phenomena from a variety of perspectives.

Lo Presti focuses on the complex relation between social ontology and situated cognition. In particular, Lo Presti argues that there is a dependency relationship between the two, both at a methodological and a phenomenological level. Research on social ontology, he argues, depends on research on social cognition. At the same time, social phenomena influence social cognitive processes and interaction, which in turn influence social phenomena.

Lauer discusses the role of shared worldviews and social identities in the explanation of intentional collective actions. On the basis of actual examples of sectarian conflicts and ethnic violence, she argues that the fuzziness of shared worldviews and social identities prevents ascription of such representations to single individuals. As a result, the behavior of individual agents should be explained on the basis of their individual mental representations, rather than by reference to shared worldviews and social identities.

Finally, Townsend, who examines the dynamic nature of both inter-and intra-group relations, argues that the personhood of groups is not only dependent on the efforts of group members, but also on the attitudes of members of the wider discursive community, within which a given group is situated and operates.

Contributions in the second part of this issue are regular original research papers and cover a large array of topics ranging from ethics to metaphysics. Harbecke offers a compatibilist account of mental causation based on Yablo’s seminal distinction between determinate and determinable properties. Harbecke argues that explaining the behavior of single agents on the basis of their specific mental properties rather than by reference to collective representations requires the mental properties in question to be causally efficient. The core of his “new compatibilism” is that mental properties are patterns, which stand in determinate-to-determinable relation to physical properties. Qua being both non-distinct and non-identical, mental properties do not compete in the production of behavioral effects. A way out of the well-known causal exclusion problem is thus suggested.

Spielthener focuses on normative practical reasoning and examines whether this type of reasoning can be logically conclusive. More specifically, Spielthener argues that practical arguments are non-trivially ambiguous since they can, at a given time, express different pieces of practical reasoning, each of which has a different logical status.

Edward criticizes Raz’s argument that it is impossible for there to be a genuine amoralist and that there is consequently no philosophical puzzle of the amoralist. He offers three possible interpretations of Raz’s argument and argues that none of them is acceptable, casting, in this way, doubts on Raz’s initial argument.

Finally, Horn focuses on the allegiance between disjunctivism and naïve realism and argues that linguistic arguments against private or internal meanings do not imply perceptual directness. On these grounds, it is argued that the espousal of direct realism – naïve or not – does not require adherence to disjunctivism.

The Editors.